This BEEP explains the mechanism of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and explore into its likely sustainability impact on European industry. In doing so, it focuses on energy-intensive industries like cement, steel and aluminium production as well as on the emerging hydrogen economy. The BEEP concludes that at the moment it is still very inconsistently implemented and has a fairly narrow scope regarding greenhouse gases and involved sectors. It may also give an incentive to relocate for energy-intensive industries. In its current format, the EU ETS does not yet properly facilitate long term innovation dynamics such as the transition to a hydrogen economy. Nevertheless, the EU ETS is foremost a working system that -with some improvements -has the potential to become a pillar for effective and efficient climate change policy that also gives incentives for investment into climate friendly policies.
Introduction
In this BEEP we explain the mechanism of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and explore into its likely sustainability impact on European industry. In doing so, we focus on energy-intensive industries like cement, steel and aluminium production as well as on the emerging hydrogen economy. Our hypothesis is that while the impact of the EU ETS on energy-intensive industries is visible and likely to be negative, the impacts on the emerging hydrogen economy are almost negligible. If that proves to be correct, the ETS would have a bias towards cost-increases for industry without fully exploiting the potential to stimulate radical innovation. Our interest thus is an analysis of expected structural changes in the European economy as a whole, where industries are scrutinized to adapt to climate policy while keeping core competences of energy intensive production along value chains, and others are challenged to radically innovate and to invent a new energy carrier such as hydrogen within existing energy markets.
Our article is structured as follows: the following section 2 briefly explains the mechanism and the political background of the EU ETS. Section 3 looks into real developments since the system started in early 2005. Section 4 analyses the impacts on EU energy-intensive industries. Section 5 assesses in a preliminary way the impacts on radical innovation towards the hydrogen economy -seen as a technological proxy for a more sustainable energy system. Section 6 draws conclusions.
The EU ETS: Economics, Mechanism and Politics
According to economic theory, an Emissions Trading Scheme is an economic instrument that enables the meeting of emissions targets in a cost effective manner (BAUMOL/OATES, 1998) . It reduces the cost of reaching a specific target by taking advantage of the different marginal abatement costs of participating actors with different emission sources. Cost savings are particularly big if mitigation costs differ significantly between sources covered by a scheme. This cost differential creates an economic incentive to trade. The task therefore is to build up a scheme that includes as many emission sources as possible and, if necessary, to link different domestic trading schemes. The economic theory of comparative advantages demonstrates that countries benefit and prosper economically from trade, relative to no trade. This can also be applied to the trading of emissions units. Against this theory it will be interesting to test how the EU ETS realizes the potential cost savings, whether the compliance costs resulting from additional bureaucracy outweighs the benefits and whether there might be undesired side effects.
With the Kyoto protocol signed in 1997 the European Union committed itself to reduce its GHGs by 8% in 2012 compared to the level of 1990. However, in the late 1990s the EU implementation of climate policy instruments has been rather lackluster and international credibility suffered. To address the reduction challenge costeffectively, the EU established the European Climate Policy Program (ECCP) in 2000 in order to find the most promising climate policy measures. The results of the ECCP were to support the European Commission in developing an overall EU climate strategy (ECCP 2001 ). Yet, the overall progress of this strategy is up till now limited, except for the development of an Emissions Trading Scheme. At the time, this has been rather surprising, since for a long time the EU had been critical of market One reason for the quick start of emissions trading in the EU was the attempt of some pioneering member states to introduce national emissions trading schemes. The UK and Denmark started one and others such as the Netherlands and Germany had established working groups dealing with such an idea. The Commission thus feared a patchwork of systems, since the already established ones and the ones existing on paper were not at all compatible with each other.
In March 2000 the "Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in the EU" was published. Emissions trading was seen as the best instrument to deliver the proposed target in time -certainly an advantage over Eco-taxes -and at lowest possible costs since large emitters could be identified easily. After intense consultation with the European Parliament, the Council and several lobbying groups, several opinion papers and draft directives, a compromise on emissions trading, for CO2 only, came out on October 13, 2003 (EC, 2003 . The EU was set to become the world's largest market for company-level emissions trading (IEA 2003) .
If the EU emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) proves successful, there may be bilateral interest in linking it to the domestic schemes of other non-EU countries.
Several non-EU countries have plans to introduce domestic emissions trading schemes, and according to economics, there are benefits to creating a larger market by linking such schemes. The broader the coverage of an emissions trading scheme, the greater the potential for economic efficiency gains of the scheme in terms of lowering overall compliance costs. However, the extent to which these benefits are realized will depend on the details of their design and the similarities of the schemes (SCHUELE et al., 2006 , ANGER et al., 2006 Looking at the scope from a polluter-pays viewpoint, one has to keep in mind that in EU policy the non-covered sectors and/or entities should be subject to other, equivalent policy instruments to avoid inequitable treatment. For the second National Allocation Plans the European Commission tries to be especially strict on this point (EC 2005b) . In doing so however, one needs to be careful with the installations covered, in so far as they might face a double burden with other national climate policies such as energy taxes which would lead to rising abatement costs.
Allocation
The European commission issued a guidance paper. Also for the second period, the Commission issued a new and stricter guidance paper in order to achieve higher harmonization between the different NAPs, to promote benchmarking and auctioning and to make sure that the Member States reach their Kyoto Targets. In the first period most Member States opted for full grandfathering on the basis of historical emissions whereas the proportion of benchmarking and the use of auctioning is likely to be increased for the second trading period. A lot of Member States were late to submit their NAPs for the first period. The same can be witnessed at the moment for the second trading period.
In the first phase Member states were allowed to "opt out" (exempt) individual installations from emissions trading. This has been done by some Member States especially to exclude some of the smaller installations and to reduce their administrative burden.
Linkage
In 2004 In line with its commitments, the Commission will consider further the interplay of the EU ETS with other measures pursuing the same objectives, and in particular with energy taxation. Now with the discussions on the review of the Emissions Trading Directive and on the Green Paper on the use of market based instruments for environment and energy related policy purposes this is a good occasion to look at these interplays.
EU ETS: The Development
Since the official start of the European Emissions Trading scheme and even before one could notice a dynamic institutionalisation around the idea of emissions trading, ! The immature market is one factor that came into discussion, as only low volumes and a few players were active in the market. Even if liquidity was increasing slowly it was for a long time not sufficient as especially large players (many allowances) were hard to identify.
! Another reason could be uncertainty about the rules of the system in the future.
Liquidity in this market is largely driven by emission reduction efforts that would free up allowances to then be traded on the market. Some companies fear that emission reduction efforts could be sanctioned (by possible changes) in the next allocation plan, so they refrain from reducing emissions in the current period. This impacts liquidity in the CO2 market negatively (MCKINSEY/ ECOFYS, 2005).
! The market participants were slowly getting more experience. In the beginning, energy companies that are used to trading in the energy market and also leading in factoring costs, were active in the market. Accordingly, a lot of companies, especially smaller players, did not have a thorough understanding of the market and allowances were rather perceived as licenses to produce and not as an economic asset with opportunity costs. Figure 2: Coal -to -Gas Spread. The system is working, even if there is an over allocation at the moment. Prices do react to market developments and information given out to the public. However, there are still a lot of issues that can be kept in mind for an improved system: 
Coal -to -Gas Spread

Impacts on Energy-Intensive Industries
The case of the energy intensive industries is important for several reasons: firstly, competition intensity in general is higher than in energy production with its inherent natural monopoly (the grid). Secondly, energy intensive industries are an essential supplier to many other industries downstream and, thus, form a vital part of the European economy. Thirdly, if energy intensive industries would relocate, not only the environmental relief would be questionable (assuming that other countries would not have stricter environmental policies), but also sustainable value chain management would become more difficult. Assessing the impacts of the ETS on these industries therefore is of high importance. Ability to pass on costs to customers "Cost pass-through and impact on consumer demand linked to location, number and behaviour of competitors".
In general, an economic analysis can say with confidence that electricity generators (i.e. utilities) are gaining or at least are not loosing from the introduction of the European Emissions Trading system, especially nuclear power plants. Fossil fuel power plants will incur a huge increase in direct costs, but are still able to pass through costs. This is partially due to the fact that the liberalisation of the European Energy market is not yet finalised and moreover a lot of incumbents still have strong market power in their respective market. For example, EDF can still be considered a quasi monopolist in France and Germany is characterised by an oligopoly with only four main players dominating the market. This paper will now look into the characteristics of selected energy intensive sectors.
The Cement Industry
The Cement Industry, included in the EU ETS, is the basis for every construction project and is therefore important for every economy. More than 50% of European cement production is accounted for by five major players, while the top 10 players hold about a 76% market share. It must also be mentioned that the top five players hold a large share in the global cement market of around 30% (MCKINSEY and ECOFYS, 2006) .
Regarding the location of the cement industry, production usually takes place where the basic material is available. Transport costs are relatively high compared to the end price of cement, which results in low international trade. Recently marine transport is becoming more and more attractive and therefore international trade is increasing (CEMBUREAU, 2006) .
Cement production costs will approximately increase by 36% due to Emissions
Trading according to the McKinsey Study (2006) that assumes an average CO2 price of 20 €/ton CO2 emissions. Most of this cost increase is due to direct emissions, indirect impact from higher electricity prices make up only a small share of overall cost increase. Thus, depending on the ability to pass on costs to customers, the European cement industry on average will face a cost increase -moderate or neutral if the costs can be passed through. Potential cost increases will probably be seen close to seaports or EU borders (Greece, Spain, southern France, Italy) where the possibility of importing cement is the highest (MCKINSEY/ECOFYS, 2006) and therefore costs cannot easily be passed on to final consumers.
Experience during the first phase of the scheme shows that there is significant capacity to cut back emissions by reducing clinker input and by using more non-fossil fuel (CARBON TRUST, 2006) . Thus some environmentally benign innovation effects seem to take place. The Carbon Trust (2004 and study that is mainly looking at the UK cement industry does not see major risks for the UK cement industry as there is hardly any international competition in the sector. However, both studies note that with higher carbon prices and the possibility that the allocation will be auctioned, the situation might change in the long term. Under changing EU ETS architecture with i.e. increased auctioning and with increasingly low-cost marine transportation, the cement industry will have an incentive to relocate at least parts of their production capacities.
The Steel Industry
The steel sector is a highly energy intensive industrial sector included in the EU ETS.
When looking at the impact of Emissions Trading on the steel sector one has to take into account the two different main processes for steel making: Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF), producing mainly flat products of high value and Electric Arc Furnace (EAF) production mainly long products for some construction purposes from scrap steel (MCKINSEY and ECOFYS, 2006) . Nearly 100% of emissions in the EAF process are indirect emissions whereas only 10% are indirect in the BOF process. Consequently, the emissions in BOF are mainly directly process-related, whereas the EAF route principally emits CO2 indirectly through the use of electricity. Products produced by the EAF process compete mostly in regional markets and are therefore able to pass through more costs than products (cold rolled flat steel) from the BOF process, which are competing on the global market (CAR- BON TRUST, 2004) .
Under the assumption of more auctioning for allowances and no pass-through of carbon costs, flat products (BOF) could experience a cost increase of 16%-17%
(depending on the pass-through-rate in the power sector) supposing an CO2 price of 20 €/t (HUCHLER 2007: 22) . Given the additional costs on marginal production of BOF products there could be a possible incentive to stop producing in Europe and to shift production to countries without carbon costs.
If, on the other hand, one assumes free allowances of 95 % and also pass-through rates of additional costs to the steel users, the cost impacts on the steel industry will be very moderate and hardly exceed 1 %.
China is an interesting player on steel markets. Currently, China causes a scarcity of scrap steel which leads to high input prices for EAF processes. This is likely to continue for the next years (MCKINSEY and ECOFYS, 2006) . If, in the mid run, China is to become a steel exporter instead of importer, the long term industry margin of about 5% might come under pressure especially in the BOF process. Especially flat steel would then be affected
Under favorable conditions, the European steel industry seems to bear only a moderate impact on its competitiveness. However, the institutional settings of the EU ETS and related market structures are crucial: under more unfavorable conditions, especially the flat steel production might come under pressure.
The Aluminium Industry
The Aluminium Industry is a sector that is not included in the European Emissions Trading scheme, but will probably still see an increase in production costs due to the indirect impact of rising electricity prices because of the EU ETS. Half of the EU's aluminium is produced by primary smelting whereas half is produced by secondary smelting/recycling. The process of smelting aluminium consumes over 15Mwh of electricity per ton of aluminium. In comparison to i.e. steel production (300kwh/tonne of steel) this is extremely high (CARBONTRUST, 2006) . Recycling on the other hand or secondary smelting consumes about 0.7Mwh/ton of steel.
If aluminium smelters do not generate their own electricity (as a lot of them across
Europe do not) they will be exposed to increasing electricity prices after their long term contracts with electricity companies run out and they will have to buy their electricity from the grid or purchase it at less favourable conditions via new contracts.
True enough: this creates an incentive to set up own electricity production capacities.
Due to intense competition both inside and outside of Europe (high international trade) none of the cost increases can be passed on to customers. All studies expect the shut down of primary smelting in Europe in the next 20 years. However, the scheme is only one more reason to focus investment outside of Europe. Most probably this development would happen irrespective of the EU ETS due to the general development of the energy markets and the fact that aluminium smelters already operate at the high cost end. Secondary aluminium smelters will probably not be affected by higher electricity prices.
Conclusions
To conclude, our brief analysis reveals that the EU ETS may have negative economic effects on the energy intensive industries. Under the assumption that carbon prices are likely to increase again, those industries have -at least in parts -an incentive to relocate their production outside the EU. Even the cement industry where transportation costs are significant, may decide to use marine transportation from outside the EU. Assuming that those other countries do no meet the high environmental standards set by Europe, this should become a sustainability issue.
Impacts Towards Sustainable Energy Supply Systems
If one takes the climate issue seriously (STERN, 2006) , the European Union needs to radically innovate and to change energy supply systems in the long run. Assuming that all GHG emissions need to decrease by at least 20 % by 2020 and by 50 -80 % in the long run, there has to be a massive restructuring of the energy supply system. Despite these requirements however, both energy and electricity production is likely Analysing the Emissions Trading Scheme, it partly encourages the uptake of climatefriendly technologies by rewarding businesses investing in energy efficiency and some green technologies, thus turning their investments into quick, short term profits.
But given the uncertainties about its future characteristics, it can hardly encourage investments into long term solutions. Also given other barriers such as:
! lack of seed money and venture capital for start ups;
! split incentives between users and investors;
! biased calculation and underestimated payback times not favouring investments into more efficient technologies;
! existing market power, in particular in the energy sector;
! general information deficits.
The risk of sunk costs is still too big and the coordination costs are too high for many investors. In the case of the hydrogen economy, for instance, actors such as the gas industry, oil industry, automobile industry and many SMEs need to cooperate in order to establish an infrastructure simultaneously with production capacities and demand (e.g. from transportation). 
Financing innovation:
If policy makers would adopt auctioning as the preferred allocation method one could use part of the generated revenues to put into a fund that is investing in research, demonstration and implementation projects such as hydrogen technology. An auctioning scheme would also create a uniform and transparent price signal for the costs of carbon, whereas allocation based on grandfathering creates manifold distortions and inconsistencies. As the transport sector is not yet included in the EU ETS, research could develop scenarios to indirectly decrease emissions from that sector in the long term with carbon free produced hydrogen/fuel cell vehicles. In order not to create additional bureaucracy, those revenues could support EIB programmes or the EU regional funds targeted to co-finance hydrogen communities.
This section has not been written down to fully describe incentive schemes towards a sustainable energy supply in the EU. Many economic and legal aspects need to be assessed thoroughly in the future.
Conclusions
The implementation of the EU ETS is the largest experiment in environmental policy in the world. Never before has such a market-based environmental policy instrument been created that has a comparable coverage, both in geographical terms and with regard to the emissions and the market volume. The EU ETS is foremost a working system that -with some improvements -has the potential to become a pillar for effective and efficient climate change policy that also gives incentives for investment into climate friendly policies. With a range of lessons being learnt and still to be learnt, emissions trading in the EU can move from a new instrument with teething problems to a mature instrument that allows the meeting of targets at the lowest cost, when compared to other policy options.
Current weaknesses of the EU ECTS can be summarized, with regard to the scope of our paper, as follows: at the moment it is still very inconsistently implemented and has a fairly narrow scope regarding greenhouse gases and involved sectors. The distribution of allowances to sectors and installations was seen as purely a distributional problem for a long time. However, the initial experiences of effective implementation show that some key provisions were implemented that create disadvantages which will have significant effects on the environmental effectiveness of the scheme in the medium and long term for the EU as a whole.
The EU ETS may create incentives to relocate for energy intensive industries -at least the three industries analysed here (cement, steel, aluminium) will be faced with higher production costs and cannot fully pass on those costs to their customers. If prices for allowances skyrocketed (say above 30 €/t) those industries would be at a disadvantage compared to their competitors from outside the EU.
As of today, the EU ETS does not yet properly facilitate long term innovation dynamics such as the transition to a hydrogen economy. This may not come as a surprise, because the EU ETS has not been set up to do that in the first place. It encourages low cost emissions reduction measures but does not yet properly provide the incentives needed to bring about structural change.
Suggestions for improvements along these lines include (see above):
! More strategic policy coordination between different parts of the European Commission;
! More focused action on deployment of key sustainable technologies;
! Sectoral action plans with energy-intensive industries and its customers downstream;
! Make use of break even points such as switching from coal to gas;
! Financing innovation.
